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Abstract 
This paper investigates why labor specialization brings additional frictions to the labor market. The 
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findings show that specialized firms preserve their workforce: these firms labor hoard and increase 
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1 Introduction
This paper investigates why labor specialization can bring additional frictions to the
labor market. Building on Pissarides (2011), the hypothesis is that the specialized
employer is keen on locating and preserving a good match because it is costly and
difficult to find suitable individuals for the kind of job the specialized firm offers.
Reciprocally, the specialized firm’s employees have less incentives to leave the firm,
because the outside labor market is thin for his idiosyncratic skills. Looking at
adverse shocks, this study extends Wasmer (2006), assuming that specific human
capital investments can become an employment protection.
The contribution of the paper is to provide empirical evidence that work-
ing under labor specialization may entail mutual employee-employer dependence.
Hence, specialized employers do not behave as pure monopsonists. These employers
reassure employees during recessions (i.e. do not dissolve the match and renegotiate
wages, given that search, hiring and training are particularly costly in time and
resources for these firms), taking more of a hit in terms of labor productivity
when they unexpectedly face an idiosyncratic firm-specific labor supply shock —
compared to generalist firms.
From a theoretical perspective, this study relates to the literature on the
complementarity between employees (Becker and Murphy, 1994) — which leads to
superadditivity (Rosen, 1978); as well as on an extensive body of studies on firm-
specific human capital (Becker, 1962; Gibbons and Waldman, 2004; Lazear, 2009;
Gathmann and Scho¨nberg, 2010) highlighting aspects such as low substitutability
of employees. It is also intersected by monopsony (Sullivan, 1989; Manning, 2003;
Ashenfelter et al., 2010; Staiger et al. 2010) and search models (Mortensen and
Pissarides 1994).
This study relies on two main assumptions. The first one is that working
under high levels of the division of labor fosters labor productivity (conditioned for
instance, on coordination costs). The second one is that employers can contract
with employees on a single basis, attaining optimal matches (Jovanovic, 1979).
Once the match is achieved, the specialized employer is interested in preserving
it. The logic is that the single employee is precious for the specialized firm for at
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least two reasons: (i) he raises the productivity of his coworkers, (ii) he works on a
fairly limited number of specific and closely related tasks, being the only one who
possesses information about the role (see Molina-Domene (2018) among others).
Crucially, the employee becomes more important over time: the specialized firm
needs him on the grounds they have already developed firm-specific human capital,
obtained by learning through specialization or by training (Acemoglu and Pischke,
1998).
The empirical evidence is based on matched employee-employer data (LIAB
1993-2010) from the German Social Security, which covers all workers employed
in one of the surveyed establishments1. This data feature is important, because
it allows us to build the specialization proxy — based on the entire occupation
distribution within each firm, which measures occupation concentration. To assess
the business cycle, the study relies on changes in the National Account industry
gross value added in Germany as a source of variation, and focuses on downturns.
The first part of the study looks at specialized firms’ response to downturns.
Consistent with an extensive literature (Burnside et al.,1993; Bernanke and Parkin-
son, 1991; Hall, 1988; Bernanke, 1986; Fair, 1985; Fay and Medoff, 1985), the results
document that more specialized firms preserve their labor force during slumps,
appearing less productive. There is significant evidence that generalist employers
lay off employees and that their employees quit. Nevertheless, the coefficient is
close to zero regarding specialized firm’s changes in separations during downturns.
Within our sample, a one standard deviation increase in specialization decreases
labor productivity by around 0.03 percent during downturns. Additionally, spe-
cialized firms slightly increase wages by almost a 0.02 percent — to preserve, and
potentially to attract new employees.
The second part of the study assesses other frictions related to the matching
market. The story is about employers who face the unexpected absence of an
1This study uses the Linked-Employer-Employee Data (LIAB) version from the IAB. Data
access was provided via on-site use at the Research Data Centre (FDZ) of the German Federal
Employment Agency (BA) at the Institute for Employment Research (IAB) and subsequently
remote data access (fdz1059-1060-1061). LIAB version: longitudinal model 1993-2010 (LIAB LM
9310). Data documentation: Heining et al., (2014), Klosterhuber et al., (2013), Fischer et al.,
(2009)
3
employee. To circumvent endogeneity concerns (e.g. an employee quits because
he is unsatisfied with the job experience), the paper follows previous research
(Jaravel et al., 2018; Fadlon and Nielsen, 2017; Ja¨ger, 2016; Isen, 2013; Becker
and Hvide 2013; Oettl, 2012; Azoulay et al., 2010; Bennedsen et al., 2007; Jones
and Olken, 2005) and uses employee’s deaths as a source of variation. The setting
is a quasi-experimental research design, which compares the response of firms of
different levels of specialization, in terms of different labor outcomes. The results
show that more specialized firms require more time to externally find a substitute
for the deceased, via hiring — compared to generalist firms2. Nevertheless, there is
some underlying heterogeneity: specialized firms fill the vacancy of high-tenured
employees more promptly, conditioned on the labor market availability. Addition-
ally, the death of an employee hits specialized firms hard: a standard deviation
increase in specialization decreases firm productivity by around 0.04 percent in
the second year and around 0.03 percent in the third year. This is true even if
specialized employers decrease the wages of the remaining coworkers more than
their counterparts generalist firms. The effects are stronger for smaller firms and
extend till the third year after the death, suggesting monopsonistic power.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 lays out a simple
conceptual framework and Section 3 presents the data and variable description.
Section 4 focuses on adverse demand shocks, outlining the empirical strategy and
providing results and Section 5 concentrates on the unexpected loss of an employee,
conveying the empirical strategy and results. In Section 6, I conclude by drawing
some implications derived from labor specialization.
2Unless the labor market is a frictionless competitive one — where uniqueness is not an issue
(Manning, 2003), or if the firm-specific human capital is diffused and general (Lazear, 2009), the
replacement of the deceased will be challenging.
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2 Conceptual Framework
2.1 Labor Specialization
At time t, the worker’s skills are unknown to the firm, there is no production
and firms make their organizational choice. Firms and workers are risk neutral.
Generalist firms hire ‘jack-of all-trades’ workers, who have more balanced talents
and are versed in a variety of fields. Alternatively, specialized firms hire individuals
who have expertise in certain skills3.
For simplicity, let the production line include 2 workers w (A and B)4 and
assume there are two skills Ss : S1 and S2. Generalist firms hire workers who are
equally proficient at S1 and S2. Each worker possesses skills Ssw:
q =
1
2
(S1AS
2
A, S
1
BS
2
B) (1)
Conversely, specialized firms hire workers who possess higher dexterity in one
of the skills5 S1 and S2, and not in the other, and assign employees to one task
where they produce at the maximum skill level max[S1, S2] as in Lazear (2005).
The specialized firm achieves complementarity and high levels of productivity (i.e.
as far as the costs of coordination, communication or adaptation6 do not outweigh
the benefits of the division of labor), but in the extreme it cannot operate if one
employee is missing (i.e. q = 0). Therefore, the specialized firm output is:
q = max(S1AS
2
B, S
2
AS
1
B) (2)
In this setting, an employee working for a generalist employer alone divides his time
equally, contributing to q 1
2
. Alternatively, the specialized firm is more productive
3Beyond the level of education attainment, specialists perform their roles at high quality as in
Kremer (1993), adhering to Jones (2014) ‘quality’ beyond ‘quantity’.
4As in the Roy (1951) model, individuals are different.
5The probability of a specialized firm’s meeting an employee is independent of the number of
searchers and once firms find a good match, they stop searching.
6For instance, Dessein and Santos (2006) suggest that rigid organizations can rely on rules and
task guidelines to coordinate tasks ex ante, while adaptive organizations require task bundling
and intensive communication to ensure coordination ex post.
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because A and B work at their maximum skill level. Therefore, A and B become
more valuable for the specialized firm than for the generalist firm and receive an
income associated with applying their best skill to the task they perform7.
At time t+1, the firm assigns workers to tasks (i.e. not a choice for the worker).
For simplicity, assume there are two tasks, Task1 and Task2 that correspond to
S1 and S2 respectively. Within specialized firms both tasks ‘must be’ performed
(i.e. as in Becker and Murphy, 1994). Each worker maximizes income by devoting
full time to Task1 or Task2 (see Rosen, 1978) and there are no overlaps between
coworkers8. There are neither hold-up nor principal-agent problems, which means
each worker focuses on a task and combines his output with that of another worker
without compensation (Jones, 2005).
A specialized firm’s production function exhibits increasing returns to tenure:
the longer the employee stays in the firm, the more productive he becomes. Each
worker increases his firm-specific human capital (for instance, due to high on-the-
job learning by training) and does not have obvious reasons to quit his job. The
employee is precious and the firm has no incentive to lay-off, because it possesses
information about the employee and has invested in his human capital. Profits are
given by:
pi = f(q)− C (3)
where f(q) is the firm’s revenue function minus the wage rate and C are search or
hiring costs. Assuming the scarcity of individuals who are able to maximize one
of their skills, C > 0 within specialized firms because these firms face search and
hiring costs9. An ex post bilateral monopoly arises within specialized firms. These
7An example can be found in a watch maker production line. Typical stages are the dial
assembly, the mounting of the hands, the setting into the case and the manual tests. Each of
these steps requires a specialist who is an expert in his role. He is fully responsible for his task
and conveys the finished piece to the next work stage. This sequence is repeated until the watch
is ready to be sold. The dexterity of an individual worker determines the quality of each step,
the quality of the subsequent steps of the process, and ultimately the excellence in quality of the
watch.
8There is non-cooperation (Baumgardner, 1988) or minimum employee’ interaction with peers,
which implies infrequent or negligible overlap between coworkers across sets of activities (i.e. each
worker is uninformed about the role of other coworkers).
9For instance, because specialized firms’ workforce is typically scarce and valuable.
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firms have some market power over their specialists and are able to set wages (i.e.
the elasticity of the supply is less than infinite), even below the competitive market.
Nevertheless, firms’ monopsony power decreases when their employees becomes
power monopolists.
2.2 The Labor Matching and the Exogenous Shocks
The value of the labor matching comes to light when firms face adverse exogenous
shocks. Assume there is a surplus MSurp derived from the matching. MSurp splits
into shares β and 1− β, where β is an index of the bargaining power of the worker
with 0 ≤ β ≤ 1. Within specialized firms, this index is away from the extremes
because nor the employee neither the employer possess all the bargaining power.
During downturns, the specialized employer has no incentive to lay off and
instead he labor hoards — even if MSurp < 0, due to complementarity and low level
of substitutability of workers (i.e. the firm already knows the employee’s personal
efficiency). Plausible strategies to retain workers are to rent share and to increase
of wages.
After another type of exogenous shock, like the unexpected exit of an employee,
the specialized firm is unprepared (e.g. due to status quo bias) and suffers a non
trivial disutility shock. The significance of this shock is determined by the missing
employee’ substitutability10, which is a function of the missing employee’s firm-
specific human capital and the firm’s level of the division of labor11.
Conditioned on β, once the specialized firm unexpectedly loses an employee
it has at least two options:
1. It internally reorganizes and invests in retraining the surviving coworkers to
perform the deceased’s role. This option can be nonexistent, if the firm relies
on complementarity.
10Working with the 1990 UK Employer’s Manpower and Skills Practices Surveys, Manning
(2003) provides evidence that employers report problems with recruiting specialist workers.
Conversely, vacancies in jobs that require general skills cause less of a problem because other
workers in the firm can adjust their work patterns to mitigate the costs of the vacancy.
11The shock is a concave function of the difficulty to find the deceased’s skill, that decreases
when the skill of the deceased becomes general or common knowledge (i.e whether human capital
is labeled specific or general depends on observable market parameters, as in Lazear, 2009).
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2. It poaches a suitable replacement for the deceased. This entails facing search
and training costs, and potentially paying a higher wage (i.e. the higher the
wage, the easier to fill the vacancy).
If the specialized firm possesses ex-post monopsonist power, it puts forward option
one. It may also change remaining workers’ wages, conditioned on the difficulty
of the replacement. If the remaining workers are powerful monopolists, the firm
is already paying a competitive wage or even a wage premium and prefers option
two — creating a job opportunity for a specialist (e.g. an individual who is highly
productive on the deceased’s role and who has low outside options).
3 Data and Variables Description
3.1 Data
Employer-employee data (LIAB LM9310) and Establishment Panel
The analysis combines German linked employer-employee data (LIAB12
LM9310) with the waves of surveys13 from the unbalanced IAB Establishment
Panel (1993− 2010). Excluding establishments with more than fifteen employees
and those in Public Administration and Defense; Political Parties; Educational,
Scientific and Cultural Organizations; Christian Churches and Representations of
Foreign Countries, the sample consists of around 9 million observations.
National Accounts (Eurostat)
The data regarding downturns come from German National Accounts (Euro-
stat), which provide different national macroeconomic indicators, aiming to convey
an overall view of the country’s economy. In particular, the study focuses the gross
value added14 — by industry breakdowns, according to NACE Rev.2 classification,
12LIAB matches establishment data (BHP Establishment History Panel) to administrative
biographies of individuals (IEB Integrated Employment Biographies).
13These surveys’ sampling frame is all establishments covered by the social security system,
stratified according to industry, firm size and federal state. Consequently, the data is considered
representative of the German firm population.
14Eurostat defines gross value added as the output value (at basic prices, in euro) minus
intermediate consumption (valued at purchasers’ prices), and calculates it before consumption of
fixed capital (http://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/web/national-accounts).
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and merges this data with LIAB 9310 through the industry code.
3.2 Variables Description
3.2.1 Dependent Variables
Midpoint changes
These are changes in separations, the net employment and the variables
described below.
Labor productivity
It is defined as the value added divided by the number of employees working
in firm j at time t. In turn, the value added equals the business volume (sales in
euro) minus intermediate inputs (e.g. all raw materials and supplies purchased,
external services, rents, etc.)15
Average wages
The variable is computed as the average of gross daily wages (in euros) paid
by firm j at time t.
Time to Replace
It is the natural logarithm of the number of days needed to hire a new
employee after an employee unexpectedly dies (i.e. excludes firms that do not
replace the deceased).
3.2.2 Independent Variables
Specialization Proxy (EG)
For computing the specialization proxy variable I work with all individuals,
employed in one of the surveyed establishments for at least one day during the
studied period. The data contains information of around 330 titles provided in the
3-digit coded Classification of Occupations (Systematic and Alphabetical Directory
of Job Titles, KldB88). Employers encode an employee’s occupation with the title
that best defines the main activity performed (i.e. even if more than one title
15As productivity is computed using the current number of employees, productivity regressions
include the lagged size as a control (to avoid working with a simultaneously determined regressor).
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could apply to one employee), in accordance with any of the German systematic
classification of occupations.
The proxy of specialization is the dynamic version of the Ellison and Glaeser
Index (hereafter EG)16 applied in this case to compute the distribution of occupa-
tions in a firm. Given its construction, one advantage of working with EG is that
it tells us to what extent the firm concentration of occupations departs from the
occupation concentration in a typical firm within a specific industry (see Appendix).
Specialization is considered a firm pattern and is computed as the EG firm average
across years.
Downturn
The Downkt variable is based on the industry aggregated gross value added
17
by industry breakdowns, according to NACE Rev.2 classification. The variable
Downkt equals 1, indicating downturns if V Ak(t) < V Ak(t−1) and 0 otherwise.
Dummies relative to the death
The DRDthjt dummies are eight — for years -3 to 5 relative to the death (e.g
DRDth0 is the dummy for the year of the death and DRDth3 is the dummy for
the third year after the death). They are based on employer’s notifications to the
Social Security system. These records are sent at least once a year or when there
are special reasons for notification such as employment interruption, unemployment,
employee’s illnesses, etc.
These dummies equal one in the relevant year — for employers that meet the
following conditions: (a) they sent the Social Security agencies one notification
stating that the end of the spell is due to the death of an employee occurred
between July 1 and June 30 of the previous year, (b) the deceased has not been
lingering with any health condition (i.e. the employee who dies, does not have
an employment interruption notification that entitles him to compensation for six
months or more, due to illness). The DRDthjt dummies are zero, otherwise.
The samples exclude firms with multiple death notification within a year
16Dumais et al., (2002) apply the Ellison and Glaeser Index to measure the geographic
concentration of industries. The original version was proposed by Ellison and Glaeser in 1997.
17Eurostat defines gross value added as the output value at basic prices less intermediate
consumption valued at purchasers’ prices and it is calculated before consumption of fixed capital
(http://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/web/national-accounts).
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— these are 61 firms. The logic for excluding these firms is twofold: ruling out
collective accidents or disasters, and avoiding further selection bias derived from
the heterogenous recovery speed after the death of an employee.
Agglomeration
It reflects the preponderance of employment in a specific occupation within a
particular area (Glaeser, 2007). Specifically, high levels of local agglomeration of
employees in an occupation — say for instance due to the presence of an industry
cluster, can correlate with a pool of potential specialists or individuals with a
specific skill in the local labor market.
In this case, the variable Aggloml reflects the availability of an occupation
within a district (5-digit code Kreis), which represents a proxy for τ in (2). There-
fore, higher agglomeration represents a higher probability of finding an individual
who works in the deceased’s occupation within the district where the deceased
used to work. It is computed as the ratio between individuals in the deceased’s
occupation within the firm’s district and individuals in the deceased’s occupation
in total employment.
Control Variables
Xjt are firm size or lagged firm size (i.e. in productivity regressions), calendar
year dummies, sector and region; as well as individual characteristics Xijt (age, age
squared, school education level and vocational training such as upper secondary
school, university degree, etc.), occupation status (blue-collar, white collar, trainee,
apprentice, etc.) and gender.
For the demand shock regressions, additional controls are the interactions
between the Downkt indicator variable and the other covariates. For the supply
shock regressions, additional controls are the interactions between the DRDthjt
indicator variable and the other covariates as well as the interactions and leads and
lags of those interactions.
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4 Labor Specialization During Downturns
4.1 Empirical Strategy
This section evaluates the interaction between an aggregate adverse shock and
labor specialization. Intuitively, generalist and specialized firms adjust to transitory
demand shocks differently. The reason is that a specialized firm’s workforce is
particularly valuable because it is quasi-fixed: specialized employees’ internal value
to the firm exceeds their external value in the labor market (Oi, 1983), given search,
recruiting and training costs.
In line with Wasmer (2006), labor specialization and low turnover tend to
reinforce each other (due to reverse causality), while generalist firms have greater
turnover and a different labor market, especially during downturns. In practical
terms, specialized firms’ optimal strategy should be to hoard workers even above
the minimum level required in order to produce a given output. Some implications
for specialized employers are: (1) they are hit more in terms of labor productivity —
compared to generalist firms, (2) they do not decrease wages, (3) employers do not
lay off and neither do employees quit. The latter may prefer to continue working
for the firm because they possess highly distinct skills (e.g. specifically trained for
the firm).
To evaluate these patterns, the empirical strategy focuses on industry tran-
sitory demand shocks (via recessions)18 and estimates the differential effect of
being specialized, in terms of firm’s labor productivity and other labor outcomes
(wages, hires and separations19). The data regarding downturns come from Ger-
man National Accounts (Eurostat) that provide different national macroeconomic
indicators, aiming to convey an overall view of the country economy. In particular,
the study looks at the gross value added20 by industry breakdowns —according
18Firm’s organizational choice can make firms more resilient to negative shocks. For instance,
Aghion et al., (2017) find evidence that ‘bad times’ can be less tough for decentralized firms.
19An appealing derivation is that labor specialization could be a reassurance against recessionary
unemployment (Michaillat, 2012). Note that separations adds up quits and layoffs, to include
cases such as disguised or induced dismissals
20Eurostat defines gross value added as the output value at basic prices (in euro) less intermediate
consumption valued at purchasers’ prices and calculates it before consumption of fixed capital
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to NACE Rev.2 classification and merge this data with LIAB 9310 through the
industry code.
Since 2003, firms with more than 10 employees face specific procedures and
costs to terminate employment relationships, otherwise the employee has to be
reinstated to his former position21. Therefore, to work on a more homogeneous
basis, we focus on a sample of firms with more than 10 employees.
The study implements a difference-in-difference specification, which is:
Yjt = αi + ρj + βSpecializationjt + τDownkt+
+σ(Specializationjt ∗Downkt) + υXjt + εjt
(4)
where subscripts j = 1, ..., n represent firms, k is the industry and t is year (1995-
2010). Yjt is the midpoint change in productivity, firm average wages and the net
change of employment, hires and separations 22. Downt is the dummy variable
indicating slumps23 at time t (Downkt = 1 if BCk(t) < BCk(t−1) and 0 otherwise).
The variable of interest is σ, which represents the differential effect of being
specialized during downturns. The control variables Xjt are lagged size (when the
dependent variable is productivity) or size (when the dependent variables are labor
outcomes) and year. The specification also controls for the interactions between the
downturn indicator variable and the other covariates (e.g. firm characteristics), to
account for differential levels of outcome changes by firm size and year. Firm fixed
effects ρj allow absorbing the unobserved heterogeneity across firms. Standard
errors are clustered at the firm level.
(http://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/web/national-accounts).
21This is due to the Dismissals Protection Act, which applies to employees employed in the
business unit for at least six months, working under an employment contract. Additional rules
apply to collective dismissals and certain groups of employees (members of the works council,
disabled people, pregnant women, etc.).
22Instead of the natural logarithm, I use the midpoint change, given these three variables can
be zero.
23As a check of robustness of the results, I work with the same specification but use a
measure of the business cycle incremental change, based on the industry gross value added:
BCi(t−1) = V Ai(t) − V Ai(t−1)/V Ai(t−1). The results are presented in Appendix 2
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4.2 Results
As a starting point, we take an overview of firm characteristics. Firms of low (below
mean) and high (above mean) levels of specialization in this sample look different
in many aspects. Table 1 documents how more specialized firms pay higher average
wages and have higher wage dispersion. Their business volume and size are in
mean, also greater.
Consistent with the development of firm-specific human capital, specialized
firm’s employees are in mean, older and exhibit a higher tenure. These features
give preliminary signs that specialized firms may be keen on preserving employees,
during adverse shocks.
The empirical strategy focuses on negative demand shocks. Figure 1 depicts
three major downturns in annual GDP growth rate. The most important slump
happens in 2008. Figure 2 reveals that these shocks are not homogeneous across
industries: different industries face plunges in value added growth rates at different
time and even at different extent. This study exploits this heterogeneity as a source
of variation.
To control for differences between firms — that go beyond specialization,
the specifications include firm fixed effect. Table 2 documents the effects of these
shocks regarding productivity, separations, net changes of employment and wages.
Column 1 shows that specialized firms are hit in terms of labor productivity.
The coefficient of the interaction term between Downturn and Specialization is
negative and highly statistically significant, suggesting specialized firms procyclical
behaviour in terms of productivity. An explanation is that specialized firms could
appear less productive, because they hoard employees during slumps due to sunk
costs and low levels of substitutability. Instead of laying off, these firms retain
workers even above the minimum level required to produce a given output.
Columns 2 to 4 show that the coefficients of the interaction term in the
absolute and relative change separations and the net employment, the coefficients
of the interaction term are close to zero and not statistically significant at any
conventional level. This is not the case for generalists firms, where there is a
positive and statistically significant association between separations and downturns
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(column 3).
Interestingly, specialized firms countercyclically rise average wages during slow-
downs (i.e. the coefficient of the interaction between Downturn and Specialization
is positive and statistically significant), as shown in column 5. The logic is that
specialized employers may use wages to labor hoard their employees and avoid
them moving to sectors, which may be facing more prosperous times and could
offer more attractive wages.
The results suggest that specialized firms may be less resilient to adverse
shocks: they have a harder time to adjust, as reflected in their productivity24.
Instead, their employees are preserved and are offered higher wages. Taken together,
specialized firms seem to bear the brunt during downturns.
5 Labor Specialization After Labor Supply Shocks
5.1 Empirical Strategy
To explore other frictions related to the matching process, this study looks at
exogenous idiosyncratic labor supply shocks. The empirical strategy evaluates the
effects of the unexpected death of an employee, on firms that work at different
levels of specialization.
Deaths happen in different years and the subscript j keeps track of which firm
the death is assigned to. Potentially, specialized firms could be more concerned
about finding another good job match (i.e. typically their search process is more
involving in time and effort) given the degree of specificity of the required skills.
Firstly, the study concentrates on the replacement of a deceased employee.
The basic specification is:
TTRjt = α + βSpecializationj + ωTnrjt+
φ(Specializationj ∗ Tnrjt) + υXjt + εjt
(5)
24The findings look similar considering slowdowns in the whole economy. In this case, the
downturn variable is computed as described above, but using the aggregated GDP (constant
prices, national base year).
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where TTRjt is the time needed to replace the deceased and Tnrjt is tenure as
an additional regressor of interest. The focus is on the differential effect that this
unexpected event has on specialized firms — or the causal effect of interest which is
φ or the differential effect the deceased’s tenure has on the span needed to replace
a deceased employee — on top of being a specialized firm. Xjt represents a set of
firm controls (size, industry, region, year).
This kind of firm-specific shock should not affect the labor market. Never-
theless, the replacement of the missing employee may be conditioned by the labor
market availability. The second specification introduces the variable Aggloml that
accounts for a greater pool of employees in the occupation of the deceased — within
the local labor market. This is especially relevant because it allows disentangling
whether specialized firms peremptorily replace a missing employee, when they have
the opportunity to do it.
TTRjt = α + βSpecializationj + ωTnrjt+
φ(Specializationj ∗ Tnrjt) + ψ(Specializationj ∗ Aggloml)+
γ(Tnrjt ∗ Specializationj ∗ Aggloml) + υXjt + εjt
(6)
To investigate the effects of the absence of the job matching, the empirical strategy
evaluates the effects of the unexpected death of an employee on productivity and
wages. The sample includes firms that experience the death of an employee and
firms that do not suffer this shock at different points in time. The following
difference-in-differences specification is implemented:
Yjt = α + ρj + βSpecializationj +
5∑
t=−3
κtDRDthjt+
5∑
t=−3
δt(DRDthjt ∗ Specializationj) + υXjt + εjt
(7)
where the dependent variable Yjt are labor productivity and average wages
25 paid
by firm j.
25These are wages paid to the deceased’s coworkers after the death on an employee
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The difference in firm’s patterns predates the death and δ could be spurious.
To capture differences in trends in the absence of a death effect, the study introduces
firm fixed effect parameters ρj and includes covariates to control for other sources
of omitted firm-specific trends at the firm level Xjt and at the individual level
Xit, as described above. Xjt and Xit also include leads and lags, interactions of
covariates and the death, as well as leads and lags of those interactions. In this
case, the evidence of a death effect comes from the sharp deviation from otherwise
smooth trends (i.e. even if those trends are not common).
5.2 Results
Table 3 shows that in this sample, firms that suffer the death of an employee tend
to be different in several aspects to those that do not experience a death. The
former firms are larger (i.e. larger firms have a higher probability to experience a
death), their workforce is longer tenured (on average) and exhibit a higher level of
net employment change.
Delving into the former firms, figure 3 compares the deceased and his
coworker’s characteristics. It illustrates that around the 80 percent of the dead
employees have achieved at the most secondary education — with vocational quali-
fication, and were working within non managerial or professional occupations26,
compared to around a 70 percent of the surviving deceased’s coworkers. Figure 4
complements this characterization, showing that the vast majority of the deceased
exhibits low propensity to change job or occupation27: they did it only once, at
the time they died. These findings seem appealing and could indicate that the
deceased in the sample would have developed some dexterity in their roles, at the
time they died.
An important feature, is that the surviving employees may not be able to sub-
stitute the deceased in his role within specialized firms — given complementarities
26Most of the deceased employees were not covering managerial or supervising tasks (i.e. they
were not decision makers). This suggests, that a decrease in labor productivity is probably due
to the employee’s absence from his role — rather than, for instance, due to changes in firm’s
strategy issued by the deceased’s replacement.
27In this sample, neither lateral moves nor promotions appear relevant.
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and low levels of communication between employees. As a result, we could expect
that specialized firms should expedite the deceased’s replacement28. Interestingly,
the evidence suggests the opposite: there is no instantaneous job matching for
specialized firms, as they spend more time to replace a deceased worker than their
counterparts generalist firms, controlling for size, industry, region and year (i.e.
in Table 5 columns 1 and 2, the specialization coefficients are positive and highly
significant). Nevertheless, the time spent is substantially less (by around a third),
while replacing a high-tenured employee: the differential effect on top of specializa-
tion is negative and highly significant (-0.697 and -0.661). Intuitively, there is more
haste in finding a substitute of an employee who has matured experience within the
firm, as shown in columns 3 and 4. Complementary the study looks at the effects
a thicker or more agglomerated local labor market can have on the replacement
of the deceased. The evidence from this sample is not quite conclusive, as the
estimates are not statistically significant at any conventional level (column 5 and
6) . Columns 7 and 8 leverage the previous results and provide evidence combining
the deceased’s tenure and lthe abor market agglomeration. The coefficients of the
triple interaction Tnrjt ∗ Specializationj ∗ Aggloml indicate that specialized firms
spend less time replacing a high-tenured deceased employee, conditioned on the
labor market agglomeration. This seems reasonable and supports the premise that
specialized firms aim to replace a missing experienced employee shortly, if the labor
market allows it.
The results from the econometric strategy suggested in equation (6) are
presented in Figure 5 and Table 5. Columns 1, 2, 5 and 6 (Table 5) complement the
previous results and present evidence regarding labor productivity. All regressions
include firm fixed effect and a set of controls, as described above. The findings
suggest that firms are not immediately hit by the death of an employee in terms of
labor productivity (i.e. the effect in the first year is negligible and not statistically
significant), but the effect arises in the second year after the death — for the sample
of all firms, or in the third year after the death — for the subsample of small firms.
28Furthermore, if specialized firms behave as monopsonists, they could be already falling short
of what would be hired in a perfectly competitive labor market, therefore n− 1 employees could
make the production process infeasible.
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Considering the sample of all firms, the interaction term between the second and
third year dummies and specialization are negative and around -0.06. The effect is
substantially stronger (in absolute values) for the subsample of small firms: around
-0.20 and -0.30 but at lower significance level. In both samples, the differential
effect of being specialized eventually (from the fourth year in the aftermath of the
death) becomes not statistically significant at any conventional level. There can be
different explanations for becoming less productive, the simplest one suggests that,
specialized firms rely on firm specific human capital and gets particularly hit by
the loss of an employee.
Figure 5 shows the dynamics of the differential effect of specialization, on
deceased’s surviving coworker average wages. It documents that specialized firms
decrease average wages — in the aftermath of the unexpected death of an employee,
and confirms the sharp deviation from previous trends (i.e. the coefficients of the
interaction between Specialization and DRDthjt are statistically indistinguishable
from zero). This effect is stronger even though less precise, for small specialized
firms — as shown in the lower panel, presumably due to small employer’s higher
monopsony power. Columns 3, 4, 7 and 8 (Table 4) expand on the results pre-
sented in Figure 5, confirming that the coefficients of the interaction terms remain
statistically significant for the first three years after the unexpected death of an
employee. The main interpretation relates to the specialized firm’s production
function and the derived complementarities: specialized firms are hit and therefore
lower the remaining employee’s wages. An complementary explanation is that the
deceased’s coworkers accept the unfavorable conditions due to their dependence on
the specialized employer (derived from the specificity of their human capital).
6 Conclusion
This paper empirically evaluated some frictions derived from labor specialization.
The hypothesis was that a good match is particularly important for firms, which
work under high levels of the division of labor and rely on firm specific human
capital. The study suggested channels such as complementarities among employees
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and low levels of substitutability, could underpin this hypothesis.
The first story looked at downturns. Specialized firms’ strong dependence on
employees, propelled them to preserve employees, even during slumps. The reasons
revolved around developing employment relationships consolidated by specific skills,
and pointed at frictions in the labor market. These decisions echoed in specialized
firms’ labor productivity: they appeared less productive than generalist firms
during downturns. As a testimonial of labor hoarding, these firms ended increasing
their employee’s wages.
The second story, focused on exogenous labor supply shocks. The results
suggested search frictions related to the replacement of a missing employee: con-
sistent with the specificity of human capital, specialized firms took more time —
compared to generalist firms. Instead, the replacement of high-tenured employees
was faster, as far as the labor market allowed it. Additionally, specialized firms
became less productive than their counterpart generalist firms, in the aftermath of
the unexpected death of an employee. Regarding firm average wages, the evidence
cast doubt on how much monopoly power employees possessed over their employers,
given specialized employers decreased a deceased’s coworkers’ wage at a higher level
than generalist employers. The effect was even higher within small firms, where
specialized employers probably exercised more monopsonistic power.
Specialized employers appeared to rely on their employees more than gener-
alist firms, fostering slow job reallocation. Given the employee-employer mutual
dependence, a bilateral monopoly was plausibly in place, within specialized firms.
The evidence suggested that these firm’s bargaining power was limited (adverse
demand shock), albeit providing a signal of some employer’s monopsonistic power
(adverse labor supply shock). All in all, specialized firms emerged as not quite
resilient to adverse shocks.
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Tables and Figures
Table 1: Firm Characteristics by Different Levels of Specialization
Low specialization High specialization
Mean St.Dev. N Firms Mean St.Dev. N Firms
Avg Ln Wage 3.90 0.69 29,774 4.07 0.52 54,728
Within firm wage dispersion 0.45 0.45 29,774 0.48 0.31 54,728
Business volume 11,700 159,000 27,863 33.900 625,000 50,338
Average number of employees 234.07 544.25 29,774 432.63 1,518.50 54,728
Net Change of Employment -0.64 1.67 29,774 -4.55 46.50 54,728
Average Employee Age 38.29 7.79 29,774 40.94 5.66 54,728
Average Employee Tenure 1,791.62 1,389.71 29,774 2,573.66 1,575.68 54,728
Note: Low specialization equals 1 if firm’s EG is less than mean EG. High specialization equals 1 if
firm’s EG is more or equal than mean EG. Firm wage dispersion is the standard deviation of wages by
firm and by year. Business volume is expressed in 10,000 euro. Average measures are computed by
firm and by year. Tenure is computed in days.
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Figure 1: German Gross Domestic Product - Growth Rate (1994-2009)
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Figure 2: German Industry Value Added - Growth Rate (1995-2010)
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Table 2: Regressions with a Demand Shock. Data from LIAB9310+Eurostat
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Productivity Separ Separ Net Employ. Avg Wages
Downturn 0.028 -0.070 0.214** -0.193 -0.024**
(0.066) (0.103) (0.120) (0.186) (0.011)
Downturn x Special -0.065* 0.003 0.013 0.079 0.017**
(0.037) (0.062) (0.143) (0.134) (0.007))
Observations 32,103 48,456 48,456 48,456 61,947
Note: All dependent variables are midpoint changes. Col (1): change in productivity
is the firm value added divided number of employees; col (2): annual change in hires;
col (3): annual change in separations relative to employment; col (4): annual change
in employment; col (5) annual change in the average of gross daily wages, paid by the
establishment. The specialization proxy EG is the average level of specialization across
years. Regressions in col (1) to (4) control for firm lagged size, year and interactions of
covariates and the downturn dummy. Regression in col (5) control for firm size, year and
interactions of covariates and the dummy. Grouped data regressions, weighted by firm.
Fixed-effect estimates at the firm level. Standard errors clustered at the industry level,
in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
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Figure 3: Summary Statistics of Deceased and Surviving Coworkers (in percentages)
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Figure 4: Summary Statistics of the Deceased and Surviving Coworkers (in per-
centages)
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Table 3: Firm Characteristics for Firms With and Without a Death
Without a Death With a Death
Panel A: all firms
Mean Sd.Dev. N Firms Mean Sd.Dev. N Observations
Av Ln Wage 3.99 0.59 81,645 4.28 0.47 2,857
Avg Business Volume 24,400 506,000 75,612 72,800 628,000 2,589
Avg Size 339.10 1223.51 81,645 1,036.30 2,067.68 2,857
Annual Net Employm Change -2.45 27.81 81,645 -23.86 137.84 2,857
Average Employee Tenure 2,253.78 1,529.59 81,645 3,564.94 1,814.66 2,857
Average Employee Age 39.91 6.67 81,645 42.76 3.84 2,857
Panel B: small firms
Mean Sd.Dev. N Firms Mean Sd.Dev. N Observations
Av Ln Wage 3.61 0.66 16,999 3.70 0.74 46
Avg Business Volume 126.91 1,880.00 15,811 260.53 759.17 35
Avg Size 5.36 2.49 16,999 5.93 2.59 46
Annual Net Employm Change -0.90 16.01 16,999 -27.5 127.33 46
Average Employee Tenure 2,462.35 1,648.91 16,999 2,629.63 1,793.01 46
Average Employee Age 41.68 7.72 16,999 45.23 6.20 46
Note: firms with a death are firms that experience the unexpected death of at least one employee. The sample
excludes firms that experience the death of more than one employee within a calendar year. The number of
observations refers to firms. Business volume in ten thousands and average tenure in days. The annual net
change of employees is given by annual hires minus annual separations.
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Figure 5: Differential Effect on Deceased’s Coworkers Wage for Specialized Firms
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Appendix: The Specialization Proxy
A dynamic version of the Ellison and Glaeser Index (1997) (Dumais et al.,
2002) with LIAB LM9310 and LIAB LM9310 + IAB Panel data.
This index is corrected by the Herfindahl-style measure to account for the fact that
the concentration of occupations should be larger in small firms. It compares the
degree of concentration of occupations within an establishment to the concentration
of occupation of other establishments within the same economic activity. The EG
index is given by:
EGjt =
Gjt/(1−
∑
s S
2
st)−Hit
1−Hit (8)
where:
Nkjst is the number of workers in occupation k working in establishment j, sector
s, at time t.
Njst is the total number of workers in establishment j, sector s, at time t.
k = 1, ., K are the occupations described in Measure 1.
i=1,.,n indicate the different establishments.
s = 1, .,m represent 3-digit industry according to the WS73 or Classification of
Economic Activities for the Statistics of the Federal Employment Services (1973).
Before 2003 the variable contains the original values and from 2003 this information
is continued or recoded (if necessary). It includes primary economic activities,
manufacturing, construction and services.
t = 1, ., T are the different split episodes, which are non-overlapping periods.
Sjst is the establishment occupation share computed as Nkjst/Njst.
Sst is the average of Sjst within each industry.
Gjt =
∑
s(Sjt − Sjt)2 is the sum of squared deviations of establishment occupation
share Sjst from a measure Sst of the share of occupations within a specific industry.
Hit =
∑
k b
2
jt)/(
∑
k(bjt)
2 is a Herfindahl-style measure where bjt is the number of
occupations within an establishment at different split episodes.
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